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Abstract 
Over the past five years, Chinese courts have placed tens of millions of 
court judgments online. We analyze the promise and pitfalls of using this 
remarkable new data source, highlighting the takeaways for readers who 
face similar issues using other collections of legal texts. Drawing on a 
dataset of 1,058,986 documents from Henan province, we first document 
problems with missing data and call on scholars to treat variation in court 
disclosure rates as an urgent research question. We then outline strategies 
to learn from a corpus that is vast and incomplete. Using a topic model 
of administrative litigation in Henan, we complicate the conventional 
wisdom that administrative lawsuits are an extension of contentious 
politics that give Chinese citizens an opportunity to challenge the state. 
Instead, we find a high prevalence of administrative cases that reflect an 
underlying dispute between two private parties, suggesting that 
administrative lawsuits often represent an attempt to enlist help from the 
state resolving a civil dispute. 
 
1 We are grateful to a large number of commentators in both China and the United States whose feedback helped 
improve this article, and to the many research assistants at Berkeley, Columbia and UCSD who worked on various 
stages of this project. Particular thanks to Kevin Coakley, Subhasis Dasgupta, Amarnath Gupta, Haoshen Hong, Kai 
Lin at the San Diego Supercomputer and Xiaohan Wu at Columbia Law for their help with the data.  This work was 
partially funded by National Science Foundation RIDIR program, award number 1738411. 
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I. Introduction 
In January 2014, every level of Chinese courts became responsible for uploading 
judicial decisions to a centralized website run by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC 2013). 
This policy, which followed and formalized years of local efforts to put cases online, has led 
to a rapid expansion of the public record of court activity: more than seventy-eight million 
documents were posted by October 2019.2 This new source offers an unusual opportunity to 
transform our understanding of the Chinese legal system by developing a granular portrait of 
what happens in courts every day.  
 The release of tranches of judicial documents also coincides with growing interest in 
treating legal texts as data and using computer science tools to uncover patterns in document 
collections too big for any research team to code by hand. Legal systems around the world 
are producing public text at unprecedented rates, and there is much to be learned from 
digesting it. Computers can help systematically map the “great unread” by analyzing 
patterns of topic prevalence, word use, and tone inside a corpus (Miller 2013). And new 
techniques of reading at a distance can also be paired with the close reading that has long 
been a staple of legal scholarship. There is already a groundswell of interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship that applies computational text analysis techniques to legal texts as diverse as 
Supreme Court and appellate court decisions (Rice 2017; Bryan and Ringsmuth 2016; 
Livermore et al. 2016), amicus curiae briefs (Evans et al. 2007), transcripts of U.S. Supreme 
Court oral arguments (Patton and Smith 2017), trial records from London’s Old Bailey 
(Kingenstein et al. 214), 19th century state procedure codes (Funk and Mullen 2018), and the 
world’s constitutions, past and present (Law 2016, Law 2019).   
 
2 The SPC website provides a real-time calculation of the total number of documents. See 
http://wenshu.court.gov.cn/.  
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 This article stands at the intersection of these two trends, toward the increasing 
availability of legal texts on the one hand and computational social science on the other. 
Primarily, it is meant as a guide to a specific corpus: the millions of Chinese court decisions 
now online. This new source is impossible to ignore and can teach us a great deal, 
particularly as political conditions in China make interviews and surveys increasingly 
difficult. We provide information on how the corpus came about, use external data to reveal 
the holes in the data, and provide an example of how substantive conclusions can be drawn 
from the dataset. 
At the same time, however, few of the technical and methodological challenges we 
describe are unique to China. Any researcher looking to conduct computerized text analysis 
of court decisions would need to grapple with a similar list of issues: holes in the public 
record and little information about what is missing, changing rules on what courts should 
post and varying levels of compliance with the rules governing public availability, 
inconsistent formatting of court documents, the fluctuating nature of databases that 
continuously expand but also sometimes remove material, and the technological difficulty of 
large-scale downloads from websites not designed for that purpose. Our general call is for 
legal scholars to take documenting missing data in court decisions seriously and treat 
patterns of missingness as an important research question, even as we also sketch out 
approaches to learning from a corpus that is both giant and incomplete. This piece was 
written in anticipation of a coming wave of research that brings computerized text analysis 
to the comparative study of courts, paralleling a similar trend in comparative politics.3 
Readers of The Journal of Law & Courts pursuing this methodology, or tracking this turn in 
 
3 For two overviews of how political scientists can use textual data, see Grimmer and Stewart (2013) and Lucas et 
al. (2015).  
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the field, will be interested in our recommendations about how best to explore a vast, 
incomplete corpus.  
To do this, we analyze a dataset of 1,058,986 documents from the Henan Province 
High People’s Court website.4 Our analysis has two parts. First, we investigate how much of 
the court record is missing in 2014, finding wide intra-provincial variation in judicial 
disclosure rates that persist even after accounting for court level, mediation rates, GDP per 
capita and population.  Although we find that disclosure rates improve modestly by 2016, an 
average of forty-seven percent of Henan court decisions are nevertheless still missing. These 
findings underscore the risk of assuming that even a large case database is complete, and 
also frame an important question for future research: how best to investigate competing 
explanations for missing data. Above all, these findings push back against the dominant 
approach in the deepening Chinese-language literature, which is to move quickly past 
problems with missing data and report frequency rates from an incomplete dataset as if they 
represent reality.5 
 Although the scale and persistence of missing data complicates prospects for 
research, the second part of this article provides an example of how computational text 
analysis can yield insights even with data we know to be incomplete. A topic model of 
25,921 decisions in administrative lawsuits from Henan shows how combining unsupervised 
machine learning with close reading of selected cases adds nuance to our understanding of 
how courts work. Since China introduced administrative litigation in 1989, most observers 
have treated it as barometer of citizens’ willingness to sue to the state, even if a popular 
saying suggests it is as useful as “throwing an egg against a stone” (Finder 1989). Our 
 
4 Our dataset covers all documents on the site as of November 29, 2015. After this date, Henan courts started 
uploading new cases exclusively to the SPC website. 
5 For a sample of articles that use this approach, see Wu and Zhang (2017), Cai and Liu (2016) and Zhao and Geng 
(2016).  
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findings push back against this conventional wisdom by showing that a significant portion 
of administrative litigation consists of attempts to draw the state into private disputes, a 
phenomenon poorly captured by either a contentious politics or government accountability 
frame. We use our recommended techniques for working with missing data to show that this 
“administrivization of private disputes” comprises both a significant and underappreciated 
portion of administrative dockets, a finding that requires us to adjust how we think about 
Chinese administrative law.    
 
II. The Origins of Judicial Disclosure 
Today’s courts devote far more energy to judicial transparency than was the case a 
century ago. Worldwide, many courts selectively publish opinions, disclose court statistics, hold 
press conferences, offer status updates on cases, maintain social media accounts, and allow 
television coverage of court proceedings. An emerging strand of the comparative literature on 
courts examines why courts go public and the effect of transparency on public trust and 
legitimacy. So far, however, this literature has focused on democracies, particularly in Latin 
America (Staton 2010, Ingram 2017) and Europe (Grendstad 2017). Certainly, government 
transparency is associated with democracies because sharing information seems intuitively 
linked to responsive, accountable government. Yet the trend toward judicial transparency is 
not limited to democracies, and one contribution of this article is to document how it 
extends even to authoritarian states, such as China.6  
When it comes to making court decisions available online, China is a trendsetter in 
the authoritarian world, and unusual even among other civil law jurisdictions. Most court 
 
6 There is a small political science literature on the purposes and effects of authoritarian transparency 
(Malesky, Schuler, and Train 2012; Lorenzten, Landry, and Yasuda 2013; Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland 
2015). Transparency is a capacious word, however, and we are not aware of any work focused on court 
transparency in authoritarian regimes. 
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judgments in China have technically long been public documents, meaning that a Chinese 
citizen has the right to view a case at the courthouse.7 In practice, however, until recently 
court decisions were typically available only to the people directly involved in the case. As 
recently as five years ago, this meant that collecting even a small set of court opinions 
required personal contacts. Today, China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC) claims that the 
tens of millions of cases available online make its website the largest collection of public 
cases globally (Sina 2016).8  Vietnam, a Communist Party-led one-party state where 
political and legal reforms are often inspired by Chinese practice, has already followed suit.  
Starting July 1, 2017, all Vietnamese courts became obligated make their judgments public, with 
decisions centrally collected on a website managed by the Vietnamese Supreme People’s Court 
(Nguyen 2019). 
 Why did China's judicial leadership embrace the practice of making court judgments 
public? One angle on this question is historical. As sudden as the 2013 decision to release 
the vast majority of court decisions might have seemed, it followed a history of 
experimentation and intellectual debate. The SPC recognized the value of making some 
court decisions publicly available to educate both judges and litigants early in the reform 
era. In 1985, the SPC began publishing an official gazette (最高人民法院公报), which 
included a small number of cases. Although not formally recognized as precedent, published 
cases were meant to guide lower courts on how to handle particular points of law, and 
improve the uniformity and quality of court decisions across China. Collections of 
representative cases, some curated by the SPC and others by academics or local courts, also 
became standard fare for legal publishers and a source of practical guidance for their readers 
 
7 Article 156 of the Civil Procedure Law discusses the public’s right to refer to final court decisions, except for 
those involving state secrets, trade secrets, or relating to personal privacy (National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee 2013). 
8 The claim is difficult to verify. 
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(Liebman and Wu 2007, 289). Likewise, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, individual courts 
began posting selected “representative cases” (典型案例) online. How much material was 
available varied, from a handful of decisions to hundreds of cases, with a few standouts 
attempting to cultivate a reputation for innovation by pursuing transparency. Fee-based 
databases also started to sprout up, as new actors saw a commercial opportunity to build the 
Chinese version of America's LexisNexis and Westlaw, although coverage remained spotty. 
A few law firms also started posting cases handled by their lawyers, to project 
professionalism and attract clients.  
In the early 2000s, liberal scholars began to call for courts to place all opinions 
online as a way to fight corruption and restore public confidence in the courts (He 2003). 
Somewhat ironically, it was not until Wang Shengjun became president of the SPC in 
2008—an official widely perceived to be ideologically conservative—that the SPC itself 
made a push to place large numbers of court decisions online. The SPC endorsed judicial 
transparency as a goal in its third five-year plan for legal reform in 2009 and also 
encouraged lower court efforts to compile and publish judicial decisions (SPC 2009a, 
2009b). These central government cues prompted local initiatives, including in Henan, 
where a mid-2009 Henan High Court order mandated that all courts in the province place 
the vast majority of decisions online. This new requirement followed a wave of high-profile 
wrongful convictions in Henan, and was one of a number of populist measures adopted by 
Henan High Court President Zhang Liyong (Liebman 2015, 161-162). Other provinces 
followed Henan’s lead. Building on these local experiments, the SPC under the leadership of 
SPC President Zhou Qiang called on courts nationwide to begin posting most cases online in 
2013 (SPC 2013).9 The new rules created a centralized website, called “China Court 
 
9 An earlier SPC notice, issued in 2010, had taken a permissive approach, stating that courts could post cases 
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Judgments” (中国裁判文书网), which launched on July 1, 2013. By the middle of 2015, the 
website included documents from across the country (Sina 2016). 
 What the SPC has embraced is a form of “controlled transparency” (Liebman 2011). 
Although the trend is toward releasing a greater number and variety of court documents, 
certain types of cases are exempt and local courts granted discretion to hold back individual 
decisions. For example, the first set of SPC rules governing the public release of court 
opinions, issued in 2013, provided exemptions for cases involving state secrets or personal 
privacy, juvenile criminal cases, disputes concluded through mediation, and other 
documents deemed “inappropriate” (不宜) to publicize. Revisions to the rules in 2016 
expanded the range of publicly-available court documents10 and also began requiring courts 
to release the case number of any decision deemed unsuitable for posting online, along with 
an explanation of why the judgment was held back (SPC 2016a).11 At the same time, the 
2016 rules reiterate the principle that local courts have discretion not to post decisions that 
the courts deem inappropriate for online posting, and expand the list of case types shielded 
from public view.12 In addition, decisions may not be posted online for release until after the 
appeal process is exhausted, an area that was ambiguous under the 2013 rules.13 To be sure, 
these carve-outs restrict our view of significant areas of everyday adjudication, such as 
 
online subject to certain exceptions. 
10 These include outcomes in state compensation proceedings, changes in criminal sentences, mediated 
administrative cases, enforcement decisions and withdrawals. The general principle is that any document that 
reflects termination of a case should be made public unless it falls into a specific excluded category. 
11 No public posting of case number or explanation of the reason for non-posting is required for cases 
involving state secrets or national security. Nevertheless, because case numbers run sequentially by year in 
individual court decisions, it should be far easier in the future to identify the number of cases being held back 
without explanation. As of early 2019, however, few courts were publicly releasing the case numbers of any 
non-disclosed cases.  
12 This includes cases involving state secrets, crimes committed by minors, divorce cases, cases involving 
custody or guardianship of children, and most disputes resolved through mediation. 
13 The 2016 rules do, however, require that first instance decisions be made public alongside the appeal when 
the appellate decision is made public. Prior to the issuance of the 2016 SPC rules, there was some debate over 
whether non-final first instance court decisions should be made public. Those opposed to the idea were 
concerned that litigants might be confused or angry if decisions published online were later altered or reversed, 
and also that first-instance judges might face undue pressure from litigants. 
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family law, as well as of how courts resolve difficult or sensitive disputes. And yet even this 
modest form of controlled transparency signifies a sea change for China's courts.14 
Why did the court leadership do it? Another angle on this question is political, and 
the large-scale release of court documents was first-and-foremost as a way to serve Party 
goals by curbing wrongdoing in the courts. This line of argument was made explicit by court 
officials in Henan: judges are more likely to follow the law and less likely to engage in 
malfeasance when they know their work will be made public. A 2017 SPC white paper 
endorsed this logic, noting that placing cases online fits with President Xi Jinping's calls for 
judicial openness and increased public supervision (SPC 2017). Viewed from this 
perspective, disclosure of court documents was a way for the courts to participate in Xi’s 
signature anti-corruption campaign and also join a broader government move toward 
transparency, a word which entered the Chinese lexicon of governance over the past decade. 
Freedom of information regulations passed in 2007 co-exist with a media spotlight glaring 
enough to expose at least some malfeasance. Officials are also required to release certain 
types of data, including selected environmental statistics and, now, court decisions. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, given the association between democracy and transparency, the 
contemporary CCP has emerged as a champion of Justice Brandeis’ well-known ideas that 
publicity can act as “a remedy for social and industrial diseases” and that “sunshine is…the best 
disinfectant” (1913).  
Greater judicial disclosure also appealed to strategic thinkers in the court bureaucracy 
who thought it could improve the standing of courts with the public, or at least help them 
more effectively monitor and run a far-flung court system. Chinese courts have long been 
regarded as weak actors, and some thought greater transparency could help improve trust in 
 
14 Courts have also begun to put large numbers of video recordings of cases online, and in 2018 announced plans to 
place transcripts of court hearings online.   
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courts and make it easier for them to resist external pressure.15 Placing decisions online was 
also plainly a way to expose the activities of individual judges to their superiors in the court 
hierarchy. Databases of legal decisions can be a powerful tool of court administration 
insofar as they alert higher-ups to unusual patterns of decision-making, perhaps even 
identifying individual judges who work exceptionally slowly or routinely hand down outlier 
decisions.  
Technophiles inside China’s political-legal system have further argued that 
algorithms derived from mass digitization of court opinions can advance the efficiency and 
standardization of China's courts. Some court leaders are on the record discussing hopes that 
artificial intelligence can ensure consistent decision-making (同案同判), and reduce judges' 
workload by drafting parts of opinions or deciding easy cases.  A number of experiments are 
underway to use technology to ensure standardization. SPC President Zhou Qiang, in 
particular, is associated with the idea of smart courts (智慧法院) and has talked about how 
computer-assisted judging could improve litigant satisfaction by ensuring consistent, fair, 
and transparent dispute resolution (Jie 2016). In contrast to past concerns about catching up 
with other countries, there is a possibility that Chinese courts could leapfrog past the rest of 
the world into the futuristic world of computerized judging. China’s first forays with 
computer-assisted judging have been small-scale and some Chinese judges express 
skepticism about computerized adjudication. Nevertheless, these experiments place new 
importance on court opinions as the source of data that programmers are nowusing to 
construct algorithms used to standardize outcomes or decide cases.  
 
15 Other Chinese institutions, notably the Ministry of Environmental Protection and the stock exchanges, have 
also used the threat of public exposure to curb wrongdoing and boost their own standing. The difference is that 
environmental and securities authorities have sought to use transparency to control behavior of third parties, 
while courts are using transparency to control misconduct within their own institution. On how transparency is 
“good medicine” (良药) to combat favoritism and local government influence over judicial decision-making, 
see You (2013). 
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III. Data and Methods: The Henan Dataset 
The Henan dataset is a collection of 1,058,986 court documents from the Henan High 
Court website (Table 1). We chose to focus on cases from a single province, Henan, for 
three reasons. First, Henan started putting cases online earlier than most other provinces and 
posted hundreds of thousands of cases prior to the launch of the SPC website. Studying 
Henan allows us to look further back in time than would be possible in other provinces. 
Second, Henan ranks in the bottom third of Chinese provinces in per-capita GDP.  
Examining court practice in Henan is a useful corrective to scholars' tendency to focus on 
courts in rich areas, where researchers have often enjoyed better access. Our study also 
reveals significant differences even within Henan—perhaps not surprising given that the 
province is home to nearly 100 million people and 184 courts. Third, a provincial focus 
makes finer-grained analysis possible. It is feasible to collect information about individual 
courts, and to explore reasons for differences among them. 
 
 
Table 1: Documents in the Henan Dataset 
 Year Civil Decisions 
Criminal 
Decisions 
Administrative 
Decisions 
Enforcement 
Decisions Other Total 
2015 148023 39609 7913 26134 1228 222907 
2014 194616 59609 9067 20926 1883 286101 
2013 120050 46226 3884 4240 666 175066 
2012 66316 30578 2429 972 201 100496 
2011 59379 29751 2513 417 222 92282 
2010 60713 31331 3187 428 349 96008 
2009 42583 17779 2566 407 3363 66698 
2008 1836 347 142 21 434 2780 
2007 86 6 0 12 28 132 
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2006 19 2 0 0 13 34 
1996-2005 65 16 5 10 8 104 
Unspecified 61 1 4 625 15687 16378 
Total 693747 255255 31710 54192 24082 1058986 
 
 Creating this collection of court documents took 18 months of effort by a team of 
research assistants with a background in computer science. They developed software to 
scrape more than one million court documents, and wrote code known as a parsing script to 
help the computer differentiate different parts of court documents. Due to the number of 
documents, a parsing script is necessary for such basic tasks as counting document types or 
knowing how many documents each court uploaded. In terms of format, court opinions 
follow guidelines set by the SPC, with some local variation.16 They open with a header that 
includes the court name, case type, and case number. Next comes a list of parties to the case, 
including information about the lawyers, legal workers or other persons acting as legal 
representatives involved in the proceedings. The substantial middle of the opinion follows, 
usually with a summary of the claims and arguments presented by each party, the facts and 
evidence reviewed by the court, and the court's legal reasoning and decision. The final 
paragraph of the decision apportions legal fees to the parties, before closing with the names 
of the court personnel who heard the case and the date of the judgment. 
 The ability to parse cases yielded Table 1,17 a detailed look at the types of documents 
contained in the Henan dataset. The 1,058,986 court documents span the years between 
1996 and 2015, with the great majority dating from 2008-2015. Major categories include 
693,747 decisions in civil disputes, 255,255 decisions in criminal cases, and 31,710 
 
16 See SPC 2016b for the most recent guidelines. 
17 A few notes on classification: 1) Joint civil/criminal cases (刑事附带民事) are classified as criminal; 2) The 
“unspecified” row contains 16,378 documents where the date was missing or obviously wrong (e.g. year 2022). 
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decisions in administrative cases. There are also a substantial number of enforcement 
actions (54,192). 
 
IV. What’s Missing? Assessing Bias 
For all that is available, the Henan dataset is also clearly incomplete and 
documenting what is missing is an urgent task for researchers. Below, we document what 
we call “the missingness problem:” variation in court compliance with the national mandate 
for disclosure. We find wide variation in disclosure rates across courts that does not fully 
track the conventional explanations, such as mediation rates or GDP per capita.18 In contrast 
our analysis suggests that variation in transparency across courts is most likely due to 
variation in how courts have interpreted the national rules surrounding disclosure. Some 
courts are more diligent than others in disclosing decisions, especially as court leaders likely 
vary in how much emphasis they place on transparency. 
 In 2014, internal court statistics report that Henan courts completed 685,890 cases, 
compared to 286,101 documents in our collection.19 On average, this means that Henan 
courts placed just over 41 percent of their docket online, a proportion in line with recent 
national estimates that slightly less than half of 2014 and 2015 cases appear on the SPC 
website (Ma, Yu, and He 2016). However, this average disguises tremendous variation. The 
highest-ranking court in our sample released enough documents to plausibly cover 83 
percent of completed cases, compared to just 14 percent for the least compliant court.20 This 
 
18 Using the province as the unit of analysis, Ma, Yu and He (2016) find a correlation between court disclosure rates 
and GDP per capita (208-209). To the best of our knowledge, no existing research examines whether mediation rates 
are correlated to court disclosure rates. A common sense explanation, however, would be that courts with higher 
mediation rates have lower disclosure rates because they there is no obligation to release mediation agreements.  
19 The data on court totals are from internal court statistics that were provided by a contact inside the Chinese court 
system.  
20 All estimates should be treated as upper bounds.  As discussed further below, courts sometimes publicly post 
more than one decision related to a case. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985861 
 14 
variation is particularly striking for a province that had released rules concerning what must 
go online by 2014, and had already begun ranking courts based on their compliance with 
provincial transparency policy. 
 Nor has variation in disclosure rates between courts disappeared.  During a research 
trip in May 2017, many Henan judges and scholars argued that 2014 was early in the 
adoption of mandatory disclosure, and that disclosure rates had dramatically improved and 
become more uniform since then.21 There are now clearer SPC rules about what should be 
disclosed, and disclosure is now the default. In addition, the Henan courts introduced 
software in mid-2016 that automatically uploads court documents to the SPC server, unless 
the presiding judge indicates a reason the case should not be made public and a higher-
ranking judge in the court approves a request not to disclose. Yet our analysis of fifty-five 
courts with publicly available work reports for 2016 shows an average disclosure rate of 54 
percent—an improvement over 2014’s average disclosure rate of 41 percent, but hardly the 
end of the missingness problem (Figure 1).22 Variation between courts also persists. The 
highest-ranking court in our 2016 sample has a disclosure rate of 93 percent, compared to 
just 26 percent for the least compliant court.  
 
Figure 1: Proportion of Cases Online by Court in the Henan Dataset, 2014 and 2016 
 
 
21 In May 2017, we presented a draft version of this paper at Zhengzhou University, and solicited feedback from a 
mixed audience of scholars, judges, and other legal professionals. A common reaction was that 2014 was ancient 
history, and the missingness problem should be much improved and possibly totally solved.  One judge commented 
that if we re-ran our plot of cases for 2016 we would find little variation, with courts all disclosing 80 to 90 
percent of their docket. Although the trend is certainly toward greater disclosure of cases, as shown in Figure 
1, our analysis shows that the public record is still far from complete.   
22 We were unable to obtain internal court statistics on the total number of cases resolved by each court for 2016. 
Instead, we looked online for each court’s public 2016 court work report, finding work reports—and thus data—for 
fifty-five courts. A direct comparison of the same fifty-nine courts in 2014 and 2016 show a modest jump in 
disclosure rates from 42 percent to 54 percent.  Our measure of cases available for 2016 is based on a separate 
dataset of Henan cases posted to the central SPC website, as the Henan High Court Website stopped posting new 
cases at the end of 2015. The primary dataset used in this paper, which was obtained from the Henan High Court 
Website, remains a valuable window onto court practices in Henan between 2012 and 2015, particularly because  
not all of the documents related to those cases migrated to the central SPC website.   
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What might explain the variation in disclosure rates across courts?  One obvious 
explanation is that the national disclosure rules may affect courts differently. For example, 
mediation agreements are not required to be posted online, and courts with lower disclosure 
rates could rely more heavily on mediation.  However, further analysis of the 2014 data 
shows that accounting for mediation does not explain differences across courts. In Henan, 
internal court statistics count 110,134 mediated cases in 201423 and accounting for 
mediation as described in footnote 22 boosts the average disclosure rate to 52 percent.24 
Adjusting for mediation also results in even more variation across courts. Although the least 
compliant court only released enough documents plausibly to cover 20 percent of completed 
cases, adjusting for mediation yields four courts that released enough documents potentially 
to cover 100 percent of decided cases.25 
 
23 We obtained data on the total number of mediated cases for nearly all Henan courts. This analysis is based 
on data from 180 courts, rather than all 183 courts in existence in 2014, as we were able to verify that three 
courts had clerical errors in the official data for mediation. Henan established one new court in 2016, for a total 
of 184 courts as of early 2017.  
24 To account for mediation, we subtracted the number of mediated cases from the total number of cases the 
court reported handing. This gave us the total number of cases resolved through adjudication, which we 
compared to the number of documents for each court in the Henan dataset. 
25 The most compliant court, the Sheqi county basic level court, released 9 percent more documents than the 
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Another obvious place to look for explanations of variation in transparency is court 
resources. Resource bias suggests that variation in court transparency stems from underlying 
resource constraints, particularly the availability of personnel to collect judicial decisions, 
blackout personal information, and place them online (Grimmer, Roberts and Stewart 2018). 
Nationwide, Ma et al. (2016) show a statistically significant correlation between per capita 
GDP and the 2014 interprovincial disclosure rate, which provides some support for the idea 
that resource bias might matter (208-9). However, our parallel efforts to investigate the 
relationship among GDP per capita, population, and the 2014 disclosure rates for individual 
courts within Henan province show no statistically significant relationship among the 
variables (Appendix B).26 
Rather, we find evidence within the Henan data that how courts interpret the rules 
explains at least some of the variation in transparency. In other words, diligence bias – or 
the degree to which courts scrupulously adhere to national guidelines – helps explain 
missingness. Divorce cases provide a good example of variation in how closely courts 
adhered to national rules on disclosure. 27  From January 1, 2014 through September 20, 
2016, the SPC rules were that divorce decisions should only be made public if the names of 
the parties were redacted. Then, in July 2016, the SPC changed the rules to protect personal 
privacy more fully and prohibited courts from disclosing divorce decisions.28 In our dataset, 
however, we find that un-redacted divorce cases are common prior to 2016, and that some 
courts continued posting divorce cases even after the prohibition on releasing them took 
 
number of cases it reported completing in 2014. Courts may release multiple decisions in the same case in 
order to resolve procedural or jurisdictional issues before issuing a final judgment.  
26 We use population as a rough proxy for the business of individual courts, making the assumption that courts 
located in populous areas are busier than those located in less inhabited areas.  During fieldwork in Henan in 2017 
we heard from judges that high-population districts might have lower disclosure rates due to larger per-judge 
caseloads. If anything, we find a negative relationship between GDP per capita and transparency and a positive 
relationship between population and transparency, both of which run counter to our intuition. 
27 Divorce cases are defined here as civil cases with “divorce” [离婚] in the title of the case. 
28 The new rules became effective on October 1, 2016. 
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effect. Our dataset contains 29,982 divorce decisions in 2014, an average of 5% of the cases 
posted in each court, and this average only falls to 3.5% of the cases posted in each court in 
2016 (for a total of 38,585 cases posted). As shown in Figure 2, in both 2014 and 2016, the 
proportion of divorce cases posted online is positively correlated with the proportion of the 
total docket online.  This suggests that courts with high transparency rates might be 
releasing more documents than SPC rules suggest, and that courts with low transparency 
rates are more strictly following the SPC rules.  
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Transparency and Proportion of Divorce Cases, 2014 and 2016.  Both years show a strong 
correlation between transparency and divorce cases, indicating that court policy on releasing divorce cases may explain 
variation in transparency. 
 
Diligence bias could also help explain differences in disclosure rates between basic 
and intermediate courts. Under SPC rules, first instance decisions may only be released after 
any subsequent appeal concludes. This rule creates a time lag between first instance 
decisions and putting those cases online, which may lead to an unintended disclosure gap 
between basic and intermediate courts.  Even though almost all 2014 cases should have been 
resolved by the time we collected the data, the average intermediate court released enough 
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documents to cover 56 percent of cases decided in 2014 compared to an average of 40 
percent for basic level courts, a statistically significant difference (p<.001).29 In 2016, this 
trend held with intermediate courts disclosing 63 percent of documents compared to 51 
percent for basic level courts, still a statistically significant difference (p=.047). Our 
interpretation is that some first instance cases may not be posted online because some lower 
court judges are unaware when appeals are resolved.30 Diligence bias also helps explain why 
there is no relationship between court transparency and GDP per capita.  Although our 
initial expectation might be that resource-rich courts have the human bandwidth to place 
more documents online, they might also use that capacity strictly to follow SPC standards 
surrounding non-disclosure, such that fewer documents end up online.  
Of course, it is impossible to determine exactly what is not in our dataset, and it is 
also likely that more than one type of bias is at play. For their part, Henan legal 
professionals typically reached for explanations about the importance of court leadership 
when we asked about variation in disclosure rates during fieldwork there in 2017. Their 
explanation is that court presidents vary in the value they place on transparency, particularly 
how much they care about their court’s performance in annual province-wide disclosure 
rankings, and the degree to which they prioritize disclosure rates in evaluating individual 
judges.31 There is also some evidence this might be true, and that court presidents respond to 
 
29 Adjusting for mediation rates, intermediate courts released enough documents potentially to cover 70 percent of 
all cases decided, compared to an average of 50 percent for basic level courts, a statistically significant difference 
(p=.0002). 
30 This was a particularly important issue in 2014, when the rules governing the disclosure of first instance 
cases were unclear. It is likely a less of an issue today as the 2016 clarify that first instance cases should be 
automatically made public after appeals are decided. In 2014, courts also had widely different approaches 
posting the short judgments known as caidingshu (裁定书), many of which resolve cases without deciding the 
merits of a claim or that are based on summary procedures, and disclosure of enforcement-related documents. 
31 Specific evaluation metrics for judges and courts are often set by intermediate courts, so the weight given to 
disclosure rates in court evaluations can vary within a province. Courts that prioritize transparency may 
strategically place additional documents online to boost their court's standing in the disclosure rankings. For 
example, some Henan courts continued to release divorce decisions even after the SPC deemed divorce-related 
documents unsuitable for online publication. Of course, this behavior also could be due to administrative 
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the incentives created by rankings and evaluation. Ma, Yu, and He (2016) discovered 
through fieldwork that some courts face a “small exam” each quarter (季度小考), as well as 
a major year-end evaluation (年度大考), and that uploads of judicial decisions to the SPC 
website spike at the end of the quarter just ahead of court evaluations. 
In contrast, American audiences typically speculate that records of politically sensitive 
cases are suppressed by the court leadership. Again, there is some evidence that this is true. In 
Henan, in particular, lawyers routinely note that cases they have handled that involve politically 
well-connected parties are frequently missing from online databases. Administrative censorship 
is particularly hard to document, however, because courts are reluctant to discuss it. Technically, 
Chinese courts are supposed to publicly release a written reason for any judicial decision they 
choose not to publicly disclose. Even though they rarely comply with this directive, our analysis 
of 2,472 of such documents only includes three examples of courts willing to either cite the 
catch-all “inappropriate to publish” provision of the rules or admit that they are suppressing 
collective cases (群体性案件). Of these courts, only a Shandong court disclosed enough detail to 
identify the type of case held back from public view, a string of collective labor disputes.  
In summary, there are three credible explanations for what is missing: administrative 
censorship, incentive bias, and diligence bias.  These three explanations collectively lay the 
groundwork for future research. What is needed is a sustained, cooperative effort to document 
the relative importance of different types of biases in China's new online case databases and 
trace change over time.  
What to do in the meantime, then, as missing cases will affect every analysis? 
Building on Grimmer and Stewart’s four principles of automated content analysis (2013), 
 
convenience or clerical errors.  
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we offer three concrete suggestions about how to learn from a rich, incomplete dataset. First, 
we can seek out pockets of excellent data. Although the results will not be generalizable to 
all courts, they will provide more certain answers. At the very least, some researchers may 
decide that a smaller scale analysis of a more complete corpus is a worthwhile tradeoff.32 
Second, we can use what we know about missingness to bound our estimates of the 
prevalence of a phenomenon. Frequency estimates of any type of case can be bounded by 
assuming that all missing cases belong to the set (the upper bound) and then assuming that 
no missing cases belong to the set (the lower bound). And third, computational text analysis 
can be combined with qualitative research. Computational text analysis is particularly 
valuable preceding fieldwork, when it can be used to uncover patterns and suggest questions 
that we would not have otherwise known to ask.  We are especially optimistic about what 
we can learn by asking local legal professionals—especially experts or repeat players in a 
particular area of law—to comment on preliminary results from computational text analysis. 
There is no substitute for local knowledge and, given how much data is missing, checking if 
findings are credible is an important reality check. Conversations with Chinese scholars, 
judges, lawyers and even plaintiffs can also help suggest explanations for trends, as well as 
further research questions. We illustrate these three approaches in the next section, using 
administrative litigation as a case study to illustrate how to work with a large, incomplete 
dataset.    
 
V. Court Decisions as Data: Insights into Administrative Litigation 
 Administrative law is a natural starting point for students of Chinese politics because 
it is intrinsically political. This is the area of law that governs interactions between citizens 
 
32 Stern (2014) analyzes the caseload of just one court with high disclosure rates and is an example of this approach. 
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and the state, where citizens use law to challenge illegal state actions.  Because of this, 
administrative litigation lawsuits are often framed as part of the basic repertoire of 
contention and a way for ordinary Chinese citizens to contest government decisions over 
sensitive issues such as land seizures, fines and police detention (Mahboubi 2014; Cui 
2017). Both the Chinese and English language scholarship has closely tracked the total 
number of administrative lawsuits, a number that has been treated as a signal of citizen 
willingness to challenge the state,33 evidence that the populace is undergoing a “legal 
awakening” (Zhang and Ginsburg 2019, 285) and an indicator that the Chinese state is 
increasingly constrained by law (Zhang and Ginsburg 2019).   
Despite the fact that the raw number of administrative lawsuits is seen as an 
important data point for understanding trends in state-society relations, no one has yet 
looked behind the numbers at what kinds of disputes end up counted in official statistics. In 
large part, this is because a more granular look only became possible following the Chinese 
court system’s decision to release publicly most court decisions. Below, we use a topic 
model to explore the 25,921 decisions in administrative litigation cases in our dataset, with 
the goal of better understanding the range of cases that collectively comprise “administrative 
litigation.”34 To the best of our knowledge, no prior scholarship has analyzed such a large 
collection of Chinese administrative cases, and only a few scholars have used topic models 
to analyze judicial decisions in other countries.35  
 
33 For example, a leading Chinese scholar of administrative law writes that “without administrative litigation, many 
of the plaintiffs would still be running on the road to petition, and many of the officials would not have heard of 
terms such as ‘excess of power’ or ‘due process’” (He 2018, 141). Along similar lines, Li’s (2013) examination of 
what determines variation in administrative litigation across provinces frames administrative litigation as “the first 
time in Chinese history [that] victims of official malfeasances may “routinely” sue the state for remedy” (815).  
34 As Table 1 shows, the Henan Dataset includes 31,710 documents from court administrative divisions in Henan 
courts. These include: 1) administrative litigation, which are lawsuits by individuals or legal persons against the 
state challenging concrete administrative actions and 2) non-litigation enforcement decisions, which are actions 
brought by administrative entities asking courts to enforce their decisions (usually unpaid fines). We removed 5,789 
non-litigation enforcement cases prior to running out topic model in order to focus on suits against the state.   
35 Our approach also contrasts to recent empirical work on administrative litigation (Zhang, Ortolano, and Lu 
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Methodologically, this section shows how topic modeling can lead to new 
discoveries and, in particular, complicate categories that were previously taken-for-
granted.36 After sketching a portrait of the dataset using topic modeling, close reading of 
cases revealed a large number of topics related to disputes involving third parties. In these 
cases, the litigant is using administrative litigation to try to obtain assistance from the state 
in a dispute with another private individual or organization. We then go onto estimate that 
47% of our administrative corpus consists of “third-party cases,” based on hand-coding a 
random sample of cases. This finding suggests that a large proportion of administrative 
lawsuits are private disputes where litigants are trying to leverage the power and authority of 
state agencies, rather than efforts to challenge or constrain officials. Mindful of the 
possibility that missing data could affect our analysis, we then further examine courts with 
high transparency, bound our estimate, and engage in qualitative fieldwork. All these 
strategies confirm the prevalence of third-party disputes—a finding that ought to shift the 
field’s interpretation of what a growing administrative caseload means, and temper 
conclusions that it signifies either popular dissatisfaction with the state or a step toward the 
expansion of judicial review.  
Before walking through our research process and results, a brief introduction to topic 
modeling is helpful.37 Topic modeling, a tool that originated in computer science and is now 
used across the social sciences, helped us examine the broad categories of more than twenty 
thousand administrative litigation cases without reading each one. We used the Structural 
Topic Model package in R (Roberts et al. 2014; Roberts, Stewart, and Tingley 2016; 
 
2010; Cui 2017; Li 2014), which draws on interviews and small-n samples of court documents.  
36 Of course, missing data potentially has a large effect on topic models and the presence of so much missing data in 
this dataset introduces uncertainty to the topic model. Below, we argue that our finding about the importance of third 
party disputes would hold even accounting for missing cases, but substantial uncertainty remains about how 
frequently these kinds of disputes occur.    
37 For a deeper introduction to topic modeling, see Grimmer et al. (2019).  
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Roberts, Stewart, and Airoldi 2016) to estimate topics, which are groups of words that are 
likely to appear together within documents. For example, the model suggests that the words 
“land,” “use permit,” “collective, issue,” “land used,” “construction,” and “use” frequently 
appear together, collectively forming a topic we labeled as “rural land-use permitting.” 38 In 
addition, the model estimates topic proportions for each document, with each document 
containing a mixture of topics.  Research assistants helped us review the highest frequency 
words associated with each topic, as well as twenty cases associated with each topic,39 in 
order to assign each topic a topic label (e.g. “birth planning,” or “withdrawals -- 
individuals'”). A list of all eighty-two topics, and the highest frequency words associated 
with them, appears in Appendix A.     
 Six broad categories of disputes emerged from the topic model – topics about land 
and property; procedure; fines or punishment; benefits, labor rights or compensation; 
general words; and permits and registration.  We assigned each topic to one or two of these 
categories, based on the most important themes in the twenty cases we reviewed (Table 2). 
To describe the range of the topics and categories, Figure 2 is a correlation plot coded along 
these six themes, where the node size is proportional to the amount the topic is discussed 
 
38 A significant amount of pre-processing of the text is required before running a topic model. In brief, we 
segmented the Chinese text into words using the Stanford Natural Language Processing Chinese segmenter. By 
examining word removal lists, we found that removing words that appeared in more than half of the documents 
removed common legal terms that were unlikely to distinguish between cases, so we added this as a 
preprocessing step. We estimate the number of topics from the data using an algorithm developed by Lee and 
Mimno (2014), implemented in the STM package in R (Roberts, et al. 2018).  We chose to use the Lee and 
Mimno algorithm to choose the number of topics because our goal was simply to describe the data, and this 
imposed an external criterion on this decision.  We also found that the Lee and Mimno algorithm provided 
topics with high interpretability, a close reading of topics after the model was fit indicated that they had clearly 
separable ideas.   However, we note that preprocessing decisions can have an important impact on results 
(Denny and Spirling 2018) and that there are likely many other ways of categorizing the same data. 
39 Aa Grimmer and Stewart (2013) note, close reading is essential to ensure that topic labels accurately capture 
the content of the documents. The twenty cases we read included ten cases that the model identified as most 
representative of the topic – that is, the ten cases with the highest percentage of words correlated with the 
topic. We also reviewed ten additional randomly selected cases with an estimated topic proportion above .3, 
meaning that at least 30 percent of the words in the document were estimated to be from the topic. We did this 
to make sure the topic label corresponded to the variety of cases with high proportions of the topic and to 
ensure that the topic was not skewed by large numbers of nearly identical cases.  
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within the corpus of text.40 In other words, larger nodes indicate more common topics. 
Edges, or the lines connecting nodes, indicate a correlation between topics greater than 0.01, 
or that the topics are more likely to appear within the same document.  In addition, groups of 
topics that are likely to appear together within documents also come into focus. For 
example, a group of topics related to the benefits, labor, and worker compensation theme 
cluster in the right side of the plot. These documents are likely to contain similar language 
related to monetary demands, particularly related to health and retirement benefits. Land and 
property claims largely congregate toward the bottom left of the plot.  Language related to 
court procedure and fines appear in many types of cases and such topics are scattered 
throughout the correlation plot.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Correlation Plot of Administrative Cases in the Henan Dataset41 
 
40 In some cases, we grouped topics into more than one category.  In such cases, we identify both categories in 
Appendix A, but give the topic the color of the predominant category in Figure 2.  
41 Topics 54, 66, 78 and 80 removed because they were not connected to other topics.  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2985861 
 25 
 
 
Using the topic model output, we can estimate the proportion of the documents related to 
each of the broad categories of topics.  Table 2 shows the sum of the topic proportions for 
topic related to each of the broad categories in the topic.  Overall, we see that the topic 
model estimates that 30% of the corpus is related to land and property disputes.  In addition, 
11% of the cases are related to fines and punishment.  
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Table 2: Categories of Administrative Litigation in the Henan Dataset42  
Category Proportion of topic model 
(%) 
Land and property disputes only 30.7 
Topics related to procedural decisions only 27.8 
Disputes over fines and punishment assessed 
by administrative agencies only 
11.1 
Disputes over benefits, labor rights or 
compensation for workplace injuries only 
10.6 
Topics that include land and property as well 
as procedure 
8.8 
General word topics, with litigation-related 
words common to many kinds of cases43   
6.9 
Topics relating to permits and registration (but 
not land or property) 
2.0 
Topics that include land and property as well 
as benefits, labor, rights, and compensation  
1.2 
Topics that include fines and punishment as 
well as benefits, labor rights, and 
compensation 
<1 
Topics that include fines and punishment as 
well as land and property 
<1 
 
By closely reading the cases most representative of each topic, we discovered that 
thirty-seven of eighty-two topics mark an attempt to draw the state into private disputes, 
typically by challenging an administrative decision in favor of another individual, group, or 
entity. Sometimes, the fact that the underlying dispute is between private parties is obvious 
because a designated third party (第三方) appears in the list of parties that opens all Chinese 
court decisions. In a 2013 case, for example, a concrete factory sued the Dengfeng Human 
Resources and Social Security Bureau over a decision to award work-related injury 
compensation to Wencan Liu. The factory had been privatized four years before the lawsuit, 
and argued (unsuccessfully) that they should not bear liability for a case of tuberculosis 
caused by a two-decade work history that largely fell into the period when they were a state-
 
42 We put each topic into 1-2 broad categories, in other words, some topics were assigned to one broad category and 
some to multiple categories.  We then estimated the proportion of words in each category by estimating the expected 
topic proportions across documents assigned to that category. Results are presented in Table 2. 
43 These are general litigation-related words, such as “respondent” and “rights,” that persist even after removing 
words that appear in more than half of the court cases  
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owned enterprise.44 Another example of this type of third-party dispute is a 2014 case from 
Pingdingshan City involving a complicated property dispute—and attempt to kick out 
several alleged squatters with a competing claim—in which the Real Estate Administration 
Bureau was dragged to court to (successfully) defend its property registration decision.45 
When the third-party was not clearly identified at the start of the decision, it took more 
attentive reading to surface the underlying civil dispute. In Topic 44 for example, there were 
a number of cases challenging business registration with the State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce. The text of these decisions, however, makes clear that these 
disputes are in fact about the underlying ownership of the company in question.  
Having uncovered the importance of third-party disputes through topic modeling, we 
sought to estimate the frequency of third-party disputes by hand-coding a random sample of 
five hundred cases. This was also an important validation step, along the lines recommended 
by Grimmer and Stewart (2013), to check findings from an unsupervised topic model. 
Research assistants with a background in Chinese law decided if each case represented a 
dispute between two private parties, or between a private party and the government.46 
Overall, 47% of cases (n=234) were third-party disputes compared to 40% (n=201) of cases 
that reflected disputes with the government. (In 13 percent of cases, we were not able to 
make a determination based on the text of the decision.) At first glance, these numbers are 
striking: third-party disputes are approaching a majority of administrative cases in our 
sample. This is a finding that would surprise even close observers of the Chinese legal 
 
44 Dengfeng Shaolin Cement Company v. Dengfeng Human Resources and Social Security Bureau (2013), 
Zhengzhou Intermediate Court. Court decision on file with the authors.  
45 XX Jin and YY Liu [names anonymized by the court] v. Pingdingshan City Real Estate Administration Bureau 
(2014), Pingdingshan Xinhua District People’s Court. Court decision on file with the authors.  
46 Coding rules that lay out our detailed definition of a “third-party dispute” appear in Appendix C.  Each case was 
read and coded independently by two research assistants.   The coders started with a basic definition of third-party 
cases and then reviewed an initial 100 cases in order to develop a more precise definition of third-party cases.  They 
then each reviewed the same 500 cases in the random sample.  In the 34 instances in which their coding diverged 
one of the authors reviewed the case with both coders to arrive at a final classification.  The definition of third-party 
cases that we used is set forth in Appendix C.   
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system. Although there is a parallel trend in criminal law where litigants sometimes use 
criminal sanctions to seek compensation in private disputes due to difficulty enforcing civil 
judgments (Liebman 2015), existing work on Chinese administrative law has not been 
attentive to how administrative litigation can get piggybacked onto civil disputes. 
 
Accounting For Missing Data 
How does missing data affect our analysis? On one hand, perhaps our dataset is 
missing cases brought against the state due to political sensitivity. On the other hand, 
perhaps our dataset contains only a partial view of third-party disputes because courts hold 
varying interpretations of what they are required to disclose, or simply devote insufficient 
resources to ensuring cases are placed online. In order to buttress our finding, and also to 
illustrate how to work with incomplete data, we use three approaches to make sure third-
party disputes remain a substantial portion of the docket even accounting for missing data.  
As a first step, we look only at courts with well above average transparency to see if 
the analysis changes. Within our random sample of 500 cases, sixty-three were from courts 
with higher than 65 percent transparency. In these “high transparency” courts, our coding 
suggests that 38 percent of cases were third-party cases, 46 percent of cases represent an 
underlying dispute with the government, and 16 percent could not be determined from the 
text of the decision. Over one-third of administrative lawsuits are still third-party disputes 
even in high transparency courts where missing data is less of a problem. 
 Second, we draw bounds around our estimate of the prevalence of third-party 
disputes.  From the analysis we described in the previous section, the corpus contains about 
41 percent of the all types of cases in 2014.  The province-wide disclosure rate for 
administrative cases was higher than for the corpus of a whole:  our dataset includes 9067 
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administrative cases from 2014, out of a total of 15,453 administrative cases that Henan courts 
reported resolving in 2014 -- a disclosure rate of 59 percent (Henan High Court 2015).   We 
therefore use this 59% transparency rate in administrative cases to bound our estimate.  
Assuming our estimate of 47 percent of all cases being third-party cases is correct, we can 
calculate the lower bound proportion assuming all cases that are missing are not third-party 
cases.  This would leave us with 28% of cases being third-party cases, still a substantial 
number.  On the other hand, if all missing cases were third-party cases, then a full 69% of all 
cases would be third-party cases.  In either case, we believe that such a substantial portion of 
cases deserves more attention in the literature. 
Finally, one of the authors traveled to China in 2018 to present our findings about the 
prevalence of third-party disputes to audiences that included Chinese judges and 
administrative law professors.47 In cooperation with local universities, we held interactive 
forums in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu and Changchun which closed with a specific request 
for feedback about whether listeners had noticed that administrative litigation often masks a 
civil dispute. Across all four cities, audience participants noted a close fit between our 
findings and their experiences. In particular, judges noted that third-party disputes are 
common.  “We have a sense of administrativization of civil cases,” said a Beijing judge in a 
typical reaction to our slide deck. Although it is possible that audience members were 
disposed to politely agree with our findings, we take solace in the fact that at least some 
participants felt comfortable publicly expressing disagreement. In particular, a few 
participants pushed back against our interpretation of our findings and disputed whether 
 
47 We also presented initial findings to Chinese audiences in 2017, including in Henan, but without the same 
emphasis on the prevalence of third-party disputes. All discussions were hosted at local universities or courts, 
typically with Chinese faculty serving as interlocutors to help ensure attendance from legal professionals with 
administrative law practice experience and expertise. Both the presentation and subsequent discussion was 
conducted in Chinese, and lasted between 90 minutes and two hours. The presenting author took detailed notes on 
the discussions that followed the presentation, and all quotes in this paragraph are drawn from these notes.  
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third-party disputes are common or, as one judge in Beijing put it, only “a sprout.” But the 
majority of commentators agreed that the courts are often caught in the middle between 
private disputants, and that judges have no option but to become involved even if they 
would prefer not to hear or resolve the case.  One judge, expressing his frustration at being 
drawn into such cases, drew a link to the wider phenomenon of what Chinese judges call 
“abusive litigation” (滥用诉讼). One scholar noted that courts are taking steps to address the 
frequency of private litigation being transformed into administrative litigation and predicted 
that over time our data would begin to show a decline in the percentage of cases involving 
third-party disputes.   
Regardless of the exact number of third-party cases, their prevalence in our corpus 
highlights the limits of conceptualizing administrative litigation primarily as a tool for angry 
people to petition a repressive or unresponsive state. To be sure, some cases certainly fit this 
mold. The topic model includes topics challenging reeducation through labor decisions 
(Topic 1), appeals relating to petitioning (Topic 2), claims by individual detained for 
petitioning to Beijing (Topic 28), and challenges to birth planning fines (Topic 50). 
However, the “citizens versus the state” frame flattens away a huge amount of complexity. 
Looking closely at our corpus makes plain that the aggregate number of administrative cases 
is a poor measure of citizen willingness to sue the state, even though observers of Chinese 
administrative law often treat it this way. In addition to third-party disputes, the prevalence 
of case strings shows how easy it is to count the same dispute numerous times. The huge 
number of documents related to court procedure—which are generally counted in official 
court tallies of administrative litigation—also suggests that the aggregate number of 
administrative lawsuits includes many mundane procedural decisions, including remands for 
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new trials (Topics 17 and 18), and decisions related to statutes of limitations (Topic 53), and 
jurisdiction (Topic 52).  
All of this shows how topic modeling can be a useful tool of discovery to surface 
underappreciated motifs in administrative litigation, even when working with incomplete 
data. The prevalence of third-party disputes, in particular, is not a theme that would 
necessarily emerge from examining national statistics, tracking the news, or reading 
scholarship. Rather, it reflects the vantage point of the data: the perspective of the lower 
courts responsible for processing the diverse claims that collectively constitute 
administrative law. This wide-angle view offers a concrete sense of how Chinese 
administrative judges actually spend their time and reminds us how much of administrative 
law is about leveraging state authority rather than challenging it. 
   
VI. Conclusion 
A new wave of digital scholarship on law and courts is already underway, as 
researchers start to bring tools of computational text analysis tools to bear on the texts core 
to legal scholarship. For many of us, this digital turn is exciting because of the ways 
growing digital archives can contribute to knowledge across disciplines. As collections of 
court decisions grow, for example, legal scholars will be able to trace evolving 
interpretations of concepts such as fault, causation, or damages or to examine patterns in 
how courts handle specific types of cases or parties. Political scientists can also deploy topic 
models to visualize the rise and fall of certain topics in court dockets, and investigate the 
relationship to political priorities or legislative changes. At the same time, however, the 
millions of Chinese court decisions now online will not be the only corpus that is 
tantalizingly large and frustratingly incomplete. Digitizing documents offers an opportunity 
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for censorship, and there is evidence that this happens. Selected legal academic articles from 
the 1950s, for example, no longer appear in China’s two leading online databases (Tiffert 
2019). And even when censorship does not occur, commercial databases have incentives to 
oversell the completeness of their product rather than account for what is missing. Our 
general call is for legal scholars to take the missingness problem seriously, and consider 
following one of the three strategies detailed above, rather than succumbing to the 
temptation to treat even a very large-n sample as an accurate reflection of reality.  
At the same time, taking missing data seriously does not mean giving up. Our 
investigation of administrative litigation shows how topic modeling opens a wide-angle 
perspective on courts’ daily activity, exposing unappreciated trends and also surfacing new 
questions for research. Answering the deeper “why” and “how” questions, though, will 
likely continue to require the type of information about local context that typically emerges 
from time on the ground, especially as court judgments provide only one, often limited, 
view of actual practice. Thus, we hope that the migration toward treating text as data in the 
field of law will also mean a surge of multi-method work which combines digital tools with 
interviews, participant observation, archival work, and close reading. After all, “computers 
amplify human abilities,” not replace them (Grimmer and Stewart 2013, 4). This also means 
that the best work is done in teams that combine skills and insights from law, the social 
sciences, and computer science. 
 Theoretically, the sudden availability of so much data from China’s courts raises  
questions that our field will be grappling with for years to come. Overall, is the availability 
of so much information about court judgments changing the practice of Chinese law? Does 
publication of court judgments encourage certain types of cases or legal arguments? Does 
the imperative to post court decisions affect court dockets, by making courts more or less 
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willing to accept certain types of cases? Is greater transparency resulting in greater 
standardization and fairness in a legal system that has often been criticized as arbitrary and 
vulnerable to corruption? In this new environment, the list of possible research questions is 
nearly infinite and the primary challenge no longer is obtaining data but rather effectively 
using the public record and prioritizing among research questions.   
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Online Appendix A: Topic Model  
 
 Topic Label Category Most frequent 
words, 
Chinese 
Most frequent words, 
English 
Representative 
Cases 
Primarily 
Third-Party 
Cases? 
1 Re-education 
through labor 
Fines/punishment 劳动, 教养, 决
定, 公安, 决定
书, 笔录, 劳教 
labor, re-educate, 
decision, public 
security, decision letter, 
record, re-education 
through Labor 
No 
 
2 Petitioning 
rejections 
Procedure 处理, 信访, 事
项, 意见, 问题, 
反映, 投诉 
deal with, letters and 
visits, matter, opinion, 
problem, make known, 
complaint 
No 
3 Rural building 
disputes (宅基地) 
Land 宅基地, 建房, 
宅基, 使用权, 
使用, 居住, 村
民 
rural buildings land, 
constructing houses, 
rural buildings, right to 
use, use, reside, villager 
No 
4 Rural land-use 
permitting 
Land 土地, 使用证, 
集体, 颁发, 用
地, 建设, 使用 
land, use permit, 
collective, issue, land 
used, construction, use 
Yes 
5 Administrative 
penalties 
Fines/punishment 处罚, 决定书, 
听证, 告知, 罚
款, 责令, 笔录 
penalty, decision letter, 
hearing, inform, fines, 
order, record 
No 
6 Workplace injury 
awards in context 
of corporate 
acquisition  
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
鉴定, 材料, 结
论, 内容, 主要, 
其局, 成立 
appraisal, materials, 
conclusion, content, 
mainly, the bureau, 
establish 
Yes 
7 Land contracts   Land 承包, 经营权, 
土地, 合同, 第
三人, 证书, 签
订 
contract (verb), right to 
operate, land, contract 
(noun), third person, 
certification, sign 
No 
8 Government land 
takings 
Land 批复, 公告, 征
地, 征收, 方案, 
批准, 年度 
official reply, open 
notice, land taking, 
expropriate, plan, 
approval, annual 
No 
9 Food safety Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
食品, 生产, 举
报, 处罚, 安全, 
产品, 销售 
food, produce, report, 
penalty, safety, product, 
sell 
Yes 
10 Urban planning 
permits 
Land 项目, 建设, 规
划, 用地, 第三
人, 许可, 日照 
project, construction, 
planning, land used, 
third person, permit, 
sunlight 
Yes 
11 Withdrawals 
(individuals) 
Procedure 撤回, 准许, 撤
诉, 收取, 减半, 
自愿, 应予 
withdraw, approve, 
withdrawal of lawsuit, 
charge (fees), cut into 
half, voluntary, should 
No 
12 General word topic General 是否, 存在, 问 whether, exist, question, 
respondent, right, 
No 
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题, 答辩人, 权
利, 因此, 可以 
therefore, may 
13 General word topic General 第三人, 清楚, 
辩称, 告诉, 及
其, 代理, 正确 
third person, clear, 
defense, inform, and its, 
agent, correct 
Yes 
14 Timing of 
workplace deaths 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
工作, 死亡, 时
间, 疾病, 岗位, 
抢救, 突发 
work, death, time, 
illness, working 
position, rescue, 
emergency 
Yes 
15 PSB fines Fines/punishment 处罚, 治安, 公
安, 殴打, 管理, 
决定书, 拘留 
penalty, public order, 
public security, 
management, decision 
letter, detain 
No 
16 Re-settlement  
compensation 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation; 
Land 
移民, 补偿, 实
物, 小浪底, 安
置, 黄河, 市移
民局 
relocatee, 
compensation, object, 
Xiaolangdi, resettle, 
Yellow River, city 
relocatee bureau 
No 
17 Remands for new 
trial – general 
Procedure 上诉人, 被上
诉人, 原审, 二
审, 原判, 终审, 
正确 
appellant, appellee, 
original trial, second 
instance, original 
decision, final trial, 
correct 
No 
18 Remands for new 
trial -- land cases 
Procedure; land 一审, 二审, 正
确, 原判, 答辩, 
提交, 错误 
first instance, second 
instance, correct, 
original decision, 
defense, submit, wrong 
No 
19 Land and housing 
permits (employee 
claims)  
Land 市政府, 街道, 
办事处, 门面
房, 东街, 居委
会, 西关 
city government, street, 
office, store-front 
apartment, east street, 
neighborhood 
committee, west gate 
Yes 
20 General word topic General 文件, 通知, 管
理, 部门, 工作, 
实施, 有关 
document, notice, 
management, 
department, work, 
enforce, related 
No 
21 Land/ housing 
disputes -historical 
policies 
Land 国家, 政策, 落
实, 遗留, 当地, 
按照, 历史 
state, policy, implement, 
remaining, that place, 
according, history 
No 
22 Land-use permits 
(3rd parties)  
Land 出具, 复印件, 
编号, 原件, 情
况, 说明, 作为 
issued, copy, number, 
original copy, situation, 
explanation, as 
Yes 
23 Land cultivation 
subsidies  
Land 退耕, 补助, 粮
食, 资金, 补贴, 
兑现, 土地 
returning arable land, 
assistance, crop, fund, 
subsidy, fulfill, land 
No 
24 Housing permit 
measurements  
Land 面积, 平方米, 
建筑, 市场, 测
绘, 部分, 显示 
area, square meters, 
construction, market, 
survey, part, show 
Yes 
25 Forestry-use 
permits 
Land 林权证, 林地, 
林权, 泌阳县
人民政府, 颁
发, 林木, 村民 
forestry right certificate, 
forest, forestry right, 
People's Government of 
Biyang County, issue,  
lumber, villager 
Yes 
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26 General word topic General 决定, 决定书, 
处理, 重新, 错
误, 第号, 正确 
decision, decision letter, 
deal with, again, wrong, 
number, correct 
No 
27 Housing permits 
and registration 
(3rd party) 
Land 房屋, 登记, 所
有权证, 房产, 
颁发, 房产证, 
办理 
house, register, 
ownership permit, real 
property, issue, housing 
permit, process 
Yes 
28 Petitioning 
detention 
Fines/punishment xx, 处罚, 秩序, 
上访, 治安, 拘
留, 公安 
XX (redacted name), 
penalty, order, petition, 
social order, detain, 
police 
No 
29 Environmental 
impact  
Land 中原, 中国, 银
行, 重复, 农业, 
濮阳市人民政
府, 意见 
Zhongyuan (central 
plains), China, bank, 
repeated, Agricultural, 
People's Government of 
Puyang City, opinion 
Yes 
30 Pensions Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
退休, 养老, 职
工, 企业, 养老
金, 事业单位, 
保险 
retire, elder care, 
employee, enterprise, 
pension fund, public 
institutions, insurance 
Yes 
31 Collective land 
ownership  
Land 土地, 征用, 使
用, 所有权, 占
用, 所有, 争议 
land, expropriate, use, 
ownership right, occupy 
and use, own, dispute 
Yes 
32 Police fines and 
detention 
Fines/punishment 笔录, 证言, 证
人, 调查, 询问, 
异议, 证实 
record, testimony, 
witness, investigate, 
inquire, objection, prove 
No 
33 Standing (evidence 
of harm) 
Procedure 主体, 资格, 关
系, 利害, 具有, 
权益, 侵犯 
subject, qualification, 
relationship, interest, 
have, rights and 
interests, violate 
No 
34 Land grants Land 土地, 使用权, 
国有, 出让, 用
地, 收回, 批复 
land, use right, state-
owned, grant, land used, 
take back, official reply 
Yes 
35 Withdrawals by 
individuals: unpaid 
fees 
Procedure 履行, 职责, 不
作为, 处理, 办
理, 判令, 查处 
fulfill, duty, inaction, 
deal with, process, 
decide, investigate 
No 
36 Demolition and 
rezoning   
Land 拆迁, 建设, 许
可证, 项目, 规
划, 用地, 改造 
demolition and 
relocation, construction, 
permit, project, 
planning, land used, 
alter 
Yes 
37 Parking and traffic 
violations 
Fines/punishment 交通, 处罚, 道
路, 机动车, 公
安, 安全, 交通
警察 
transportation, penalty, 
road, motor vehicles, 
public security, safety 
traffic police 
No 
38 Workplace injury Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
工伤, 社会, 保
障局, 人力, 资
源, 保险, 劳动 
work injury, society, 
welfare bureau, human, 
resources, insurance, 
labor 
No 
39 Illegal demolition   Land 拆除, 改造, 拆
迁, 房屋, 实施, 
demolish, alter, 
demolish and relocate, 
house, implement, 
No 
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强制, 协议 forcible, agreement 
40 Taxi and transport 
permits 
Permits and 
Registration (non-
land) 
经营, 出租汽
车, 车辆, 出租
车, 运营, 回复, 
汤阴县人民政
府 
manage, taxi, car, cab, 
operate, reply, People's 
Government of Tangyin 
County 
No 
41 Illegal construction  
(failure to act)  
Land 施工, 工程, 建
设, 项目, 停止, 
备案, 工地 
construct, project, 
construction, program, 
cease, record a case, 
construction site 
Yes 
42 Land takings 
compensation   
Land; Benefits, 
Labor and 
Compensation 
拆迁, 房屋, 补
偿, 安置, 裁决, 
评估, 拆迁人 
demolition and 
relocation, house, 
compensation, resettle, 
adjudication, appraise, 
demolishing party 
No 
43 Labor payments 
and benefits 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
劳动, 保障, 工
资, 监察, 处理, 
支付, 投诉 
labor, protection, wages, 
supervise, deal with, 
pay, complain 
Yes 
44 SAIC 
business/share 
registration   
Permits and 
Registration (non-
land) 
变更, 登记, 代
表, 股东, 转让, 
股权, 材料 
change, registration, 
representative, 
shareholder, transfer, 
share rights, document 
Yes 
45 Mining licenses Land 资源, 国土局, 
国土, 许可证, 
采矿, 矿产, 勘
查 
resources, land bureau, 
land, license, mining, 
mineral, exploration 
Yes 
46 Land takings plan 
and process  
Land 征收, 房屋, 补
偿, 决定, 改造, 
项目, 方案 
expropriate, house, 
compensation, decision, 
alteration, project, plan 
No 
 
47 Construction 
permits 3rd party 
(air & sunlight) 
Land 规划, 建设, 许
可证, 工程, 建
筑, 用地, 颁发 
planning, construction, 
permit, project, 
building, land used, 
issue 
Yes 
48 Divorce/marriage 
registration 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
登记, 办理, 离
婚, 结婚, 婚姻, 
结婚证, 去世 
registration, process, 
divorce, marry, 
marriage, marriage 
certificate, die 
Yes 
49 Police inaction  Land 刑事, 公安, 机
关, 公安局, 报
警, 民警, 调查 
criminal, public 
security, government 
organ, public security 
department, report to 
police, police officer, 
investigate 
No 
50 Birth planning Fines/punishment 征收, 人口, 社
会, 决定书, 生
育, 抚养费, 计
划生育 
levy, population, 
society, decision letter, 
birth, upbringing fee, 
case wit 
No 
51 Open Government 
Information 
Land; procedure 资金, 联合, 新
城, 开发商, 存
在, 凭证, 第二 
fund, united, new city, 
developer, exist, 
certificate, second 
No 
52 Jurisdiction and 
case transfers 
Procedure 管辖, 指定, 移
交, 属于, 报请, 
jurisdiction, appoint, 
transfer, belong, submit, 
No 
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所在地, 第一
审 
location, first trial 
53 Statute of 
limitations 
Procedure 期限, 超过, 或
者, 知道, 其他, 
公民, 问题 
time, passed, or, know, 
other, citizen, problem 
Yes 
54 Retirement benefits Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
上诉人, 期限, 
退休, 被上诉
人, 知道, 复议, 
第三人 
appellant, term, retire, 
appellee, know, 
reconsideration, third 
person 
Yes 
55 DOB Changes Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
办理, 时间, 审
批, 档案, 印章, 
加盖, 手续 
process, time, review 
and approve, file, stamp, 
seal, procedure 
Yes 
56 Land-use rights 
(transfer from 
collective to state 
owned)  
Land 土地, 集体, 村
民, 登记, 使用
证, 国有, 注销 
land, collective, 
villager, register, 
permit, State-owned, 
cancel 
Yes 
57 Compensation from 
state  
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
赔偿, 损失, 造
成, 经济, 国家, 
确认, 责任 
compensate, damage, 
cause, economy, State, 
confirm, liability 
No 
58 Appeals rejections, 
land rights 
Procedure; Land 提交, 副本, 递
交, 质证, 异议, 
无异议, 通知
书 
submit, copy, deliver, 
dispute evidence, 
objection, no objection, 
notification letter 
No 
59 Rural land 
(surveying) 
Land 南北, 宅基, 东
西, 使用, 出路, 
房屋, 双方 
south and north, rural 
buildings, east and west, 
use, exit, house, both 
parties 
Yes 
60 Retirement and 
other workplace 
benefits 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
职工, 待遇, 保
险, 支付, 医疗, 
破产, 缴纳 
worker, treatment, 
insurance, payment, 
medical, bankrupt, pay 
Yes 
61 Withdrawals 
(commercial)  
Procedure 审查, 过程, 违
反, 承担, 诉讼
费, 表示, 为由 
review, process, violate, 
undertake, litigation fee, 
show, for the reason 
No 
62 Workplace injury 
(employer 
challenges) 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
工伤, 工作, 伤
害, 决定书, 受
伤, 认字, 关系 
work injury, work, hurt, 
decision letter, get 
injured, literate, 
relationship 
Yes 
63 Land-use rights 
(ownership and use) 
Land 争议, 处理, 土
地, 确权, 使用
权, 土地权属, 
使用 
dispute, deal with, land, 
confirm rights, right to 
use, land rights 
ownership, use 
Yes 
64 Land-registration 
(3rd party) 
Land 土地, 国有, 登
记, 使用证, 颁
发, 使用权, 使
用 
land, State-owned, 
register, use permit, 
issue, right to use, use 
Yes 
65 Home registration 
for bankrupt 
property 
Land 抵押, 登记, 办
理, 执行, 合同, 
协助, 房地产 
pledge, register, 
process, enforce, 
contract, assist, real 
estate 
Yes 
66 Construction 
permits 
Land 建设, 规划, 土
地, 许可证, 工
construct, planning, 
land, license, project, 
No 
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程, 驻马店市
人民政府, 张
运生 
People's Government of 
Zhumadian City, Zhang 
Yunsheng 
67 Applications for re-
trials 
Procedure 裁定, 再审, 执
行, 原审, 申请
人, 申诉, 问题 
decide, retry, enforce, 
original trial, petitioner, 
petition, question 
No 
68 Pensions/Gvt 
subsidies 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
领取, 发放, 补
贴, 单位, 享受, 
金额, 财政 
receive, grant, subsidy, 
work unit, enjoy, 
amount, fiscal 
No 
69 Administrative 
reconsideration 
(scope and 
procedures) 
Procedure 复议, 决定书, 
申请人, 机关, 
第二, 郑州市
人民政府, 条
例 
reconsideration, 
decision letter, 
petitioner, government 
body, second, People's 
Government of 
Zhengzhou City, clause 
No 
70 Business 
registration 
Permits and 
Registration (non-
land) 
公司, 企业, 营
业执照, 登记, 
经营, 工商, 注
销 
company, enterprise, 
operating license, 
register, operate, 
industry and commerce, 
cancel 
Yes 
71 Illegal land 
occupation  
Land 土地, 集体, 用
地, 涉案, 建设, 
村民, 耕地 
land, collective, land 
used, case-related, 
construct, villager, 
arable land 
No 
72 Land/housing 
contracts 
Land 协议, 签订, 合
同, 转让, 协议
书, 约定, 双方 
agreement, sign, 
contract, transfer, 
agreement letter, agree, 
both parties 
Yes 
73 Termination of 
repetitive land use 
rights cases 
Land 民事, 判决书, 
生效, 确认, 民
初, 无效, 裁定
书 
civil, judgment, 
effective, validate, civil 
first instance, invalid, 
decision 
Yes 
74 Government 
seizures 
Fines/punishment 扣押, 强制, 车
辆, 物品, 措施, 
运输, 人员 
detention, forcibly, car, 
goods, measures, 
transport, personnel 
No 
75 Takings and 
relocation 
compensation 
Land 补偿, 安置, 征
地, 补偿费, 标
准, 工程, 补助
费 
compensate, resettle, 
expropriate, 
compensation, standard, 
project, subsidy 
No 
76 Traffic fines and 
workplace injury 
(mixed) 
Fines/punishment; 
Benefits, Labor and 
Compensation 
交通事故, 事
故, 发生, 责任, 
下班, 认定书, 
驾驶 
traffic accident, 
accident, take place, 
liability, after work, 
investigation report, 
drive 
No 
77 Land-use rights 
(agricultural uses)  
Land 村民, 城关, 镇
政府, 树木, 村
委会, 责任田, 
延津 
villager, area outside 
city, township 
government, trees, 
village committee, 
contracted farmland, 
Yanjin 
Yes 
78 Forestry rights Land 第三人, 林木, 
承包, 林权证, 
third person, lumber, 
contract, forestry right 
permit, guard Li, issue, 
No 
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李保卫, 颁发, 
民事 
civil 
79 OGI and written 
requests to 
government 
Procedure; Land 收到, 邮寄, 郑
州, 产业, 告知, 
签收, 邮件 
receive, mailing, 
Zhengzhou, industry, 
notify, receipt, mail 
No 
80 Conversion of 
collective land 
Land 土地, 移民, 批
复, 五龙镇人
民政府, 林州
市人民政府, 
补偿, 水库 
land, relocatee, official 
reply, People's 
Government of Wulong 
Township, People's 
Government of Linzhou 
City, compensation, 
reservoir 
Yes 
81 Open Government 
Information (land) 
Land; procedure 信息, 答复, 政
府, 回复, 告知, 
条例, 内容 
information, answer, 
government, reply, 
notify, regulation, 
content 
No 
82 Fees and fines 
(land) 
Land; 
fines/punishment 
同意, 费用, 同
年, 票据, 收据, 
交纳, 退还 
consent, fee, same year, 
ticket, receipt, pay, 
return 
No 
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Online Appendix B 
In this Appendix, we show that the proportion of total cases online are not 
significantly related to either the GDP per capita of the locality or the population of 
the locality. This finding does not support the resource hypothesis that localities with 
more money or people would be better equipped to put cases online. Because 
intermediate and basic courts have significantly different rates of transparency, we 
divide the analysis into two sections – first to see if there GDP per capita and 
population is related to transparency in intermediate courts (Table 3), and then in 
basic courts (Table 4). 
 
Table 3: Relationship between GDP per capita (in thousands), population (in ten 
thousands), and transparency in Intermediate Courts 
Dependent variable: Proportion of Cases Online 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Population (ten thousands)         0.0001 0.0003 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita (thousands) - 0.004 - 0.005 
(0.002) (0.002) 
Constant 0.565∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗.																		0.742∗∗∗ 
(0.053)  (0.104).          (0.106) 
Observations 18 18 18 
R2 0.004 0.160 0.195 
Adjusted R2 0.059 0.108 0.088 
Residual Std. Error 0.132 (df = 16) 0.122 (df = 16) 0.123 (df = 15) 
F Statistic 0.057 (df = 1; 16) 3.056 (df = 1; 16) 1.820 (df = 2; 15) 
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01 
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Table 4: Relationship between GDP per capita (in thousands), population (in ten 
thousands), and transparency in Basic Courts 
Dependent variable: Proportion of Cases Online 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Population (ten thousands) 0.0005 0.0004 
(0.0003) (0.0003) 
GDP per capita (thousands) - 0.001  -0.0004 
(0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.367∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗.																						0.390∗∗∗ 
(0.020)  (0.019)             (0.031) 
Observations 159 159 159 
R2   0.017 0.013 0.022 
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.007 0.010 
Residual Std. Error 0.110 (df = 157) 0.110 (df = 157) 0.110 (df = 156) 
F Statistic 2.640 (df = 1; 157) 2.053 (df = 1; 157) 1.786 (df = 2; 156) 
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01 
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Online Appendix C: Coding Rules for Definition of a Third-Party Dispute 
 
In this appendix, we detail a three-part test that coders used to determine whether each of 
five hundred randomly sampled cases reflect a dispute between two (or more) private 
parties, as opposed to between a private party and the government. 
 
Definition - a three-part test: A third-party dispute means (i) a dispute between plaintiff 
and a third party, (ii) where the challenged government action is not the original source of 
the plaintiff’s grievance or complaint, AND (iii) plaintiff brings the action against the 
government (contemporaneously or as an alternative) to resolve the dispute with 
the third party.  
  
Break down of the elements: 
(i) Dispute: our definition of dispute is broad. Examples that begin as private disputes but 
are often transformed into administrative litigation include land disputes between neighbors, 
and house or marriage registrations. Other disputes can also fit into this broad category, 
including medical malpractice, traffic accident liabilities, public interest litigation against 
counterfeits, and corporate matters. 
  
(ii) Government action not being the source of the plaintiff’s grievance or complaint.  We 
distinguish two scenarios. The first scenario is that plaintiff had a bitter relationship with 
a third party (for example, due to disputed land ownership) regardless of the challenged 
government action, and he/she challenged the government action that gave the third-
party entitlements (e.g. land use permit, house registration). We view such cases as third-
party disputes because the plaintiff is using administrative litigation strategically to resolve a 
dispute that is originally civil and private in nature. The second scenario arises where 
a government action with wide scope (for example, a demolition or government taking) 
takes rights from the plaintiff, and there happens to be a third party benefiting from the 
government action. We do not classify such cases as third-party cases because the third-
party beneficiary's involvement in this case could be incidental, and the plaintiff's real 
complaint is against the government action. Two questions can be asked to help decide a 
close case: Did plaintiff and third party know each other and interact with each other prior to 
the dispute? Is plaintiff’s real complaint with the government or the third party? When the 
"facts" section does not have enough information to let us decide which scenario it is, we 
code it as “unclear.” 
  
(iii) The plaintiff brings the administrative lawsuit in order to resolve the private dispute.  
We use this part of the test to filter out cases involving third parties that might not otherwise 
be excluded by the first two parts of our test.  For example, challenges to police 
administrative penalties are not third-party cases, even in cases in which the penalty follows 
a fight between plaintiff and a third party.  This is because challenging the penalty does not 
help resolve the dispute with the third party.  
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